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The developed word stands at the fore of a phenomenal demographic transition.  Over the next 30
years the number of elderly in the U.S., the EU, and Japan will more than double.  At the same time,
the number of workers available to pay the elderly their government-guaranteed pension and health
care benefits will rise by less than 10 percent.  The fiscal implications of these two demographic
trends are alarming.   Paying promised benefits will, it appears, require a doubling or more of payroll
tax rates.  This paper asks if there is a silver lining in this dark cloud hanging over the developed
world.  Specifically, can the developed economies hope to be bailed out by either macroeconomic
feedback effects of by increased migration?
To address these questions, this paper develops and simulates a dynamic, intergeneration, and
interregional demographic life-cycle model.  The model has three regions – the U.S., the EU, and
Japan – which exchange goods and capital.  The model features immigration, age-specific fertility,
life span extension, life span uncertainty, bequests arising from incomplete annuitization, and intra-
cohort heterogeneity.  
Other things equal, one would expect the aging of the developed economies to increase capital per
worker as the number of suppliers of capital (the old) rises relative to the number of suppliers of
labor (the young).  But given the need to pay the elderly their benefits, other things are far from
equal.  According to our simulations, the tax hikes needed to finance benefits along the demographic
transition path generate a major capital shortage that lowers real wages by 19 percent and raises real
interest rates by over 400 basis points.  Hence, far from mitigating the developed world’s fiscal
problems, macroeconomic feedback effects make matters significantly worse.
The simulations also show that increased immigration does very little to mitigate the fiscal stresses
facing the developed world.  On the other hand, there are policies that can materially improve the
developed world’s long-term prospects.  The one examined here is closing down, at the margin,
existing government pension systems and using consumption taxes to pay off those program’s
accrued liabilities.  This policy could be coupled with the establishment of a fully funded mandatory
individual saving system.  According to our simulations, this policy would impose modest welfare
losses on current generations, but generate enormous welfare gains for future generations.  Future
Europeans and Japanese benefit the most.  Their net wages almost triple, and their welfare levels












The developed world is about to experience an unprecedented demographic change. In
virtually all OECD countries, people are getting older – a lot older. And everywhere the reason
is the same – a dramatic baby boom followed by an equally dramatic baby bust, all accompanied
by a remarkable increase in life expectancy. These demographic events are slated, over the next
four decades, to more than double the dependency ratio – the ratio of retirees to workers. Since
the elderly depend on the young to pay their government-guaranteed pension and health-care
beneﬁts, the extraordinary aging of developed societies augers a ﬁscal crisis of the ﬁrst order.
Indeed, payroll taxes, which are already extremely high in most developed countries, will, it
seems, need to more than double to pay promised beneﬁts. The alternative to such massive
tax hikes is, of course, major beneﬁt cuts. Both policies are, of course, anathema to politicians.
So whatever ﬁscal adjustments are eventually made will likely be delayed to the last minute,
making those adjustments that much more painful.
This bleak assessment of developed economies’ future ﬁscal prospects ignores two factors
that are increasingly raised as possible sources of economic salvation. The ﬁrst is the macro-
economic impact of aging, speciﬁcally the potential for capital deepening. The second is the
option to dramatically increase immigration.
Were aging to raise the stock of capital compared to the supply of labor, real wages would
increase and, thereby, expand the taxable wage base. This would limit the need for higher
payroll taxes. The prospect for such capital deepening arises from the fact that the elderly
are the primary owners and, thus, the main suppliers of capital, while the young are the main
suppliers of labor. All else equal, more oldsters relative to youngsters means a greater supply
of capital relative to labor.
Unfortunately, all else will not be equal in either the short or long runs. In particular, if
beneﬁts are paid as promised, the requisite tax increases will undermine capital formation as
workers’ wages, some of which would otherwise be saved, are taken from them and handed over
to the elderly to ﬁnance immediate consumption.
3Thus, the net impact on capital intensity, real wages, and the payroll tax base of aging
cannot be determined a priori and must be simulated within a fully articulated and carefully
calibrated model. The same is true when it comes to understanding the ﬁscal implications of
increased immigration. Importing additional workers will certainly raise the payroll tax base.
But more immigrants also mean more expenditures on education, public safety, water and sewer
systems, and a host of other public goods. More immigrants also mean more government pen-
sion and health care spending since immigrants also accrue rights to such beneﬁts. Moreover,
most developed countries provide beneﬁts to the elderly on a progressive basis. And since immi-
grants are disproportionately low-wage earners, they typically receive more beneﬁts per dollar
of tax payments than do native worker. Hence, the precise beneﬁt to the developed world’s
future ﬁscal ﬁnances and economies from immigration also requires detailed computation rather
than simply theoretical contemplation.
Calculations of the type to which we are referring occupy a large and growing literature.
Many of these studies are based on the overlapping generation model (OLG) developed by
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Typically, such studies focus on a single, closed economy.
Auerbach, et. al. (1989) is an exception. It models four OECD countries, but treats each as a
small open economy. This treatment rules out either crowding out or crowding in of capital per
worker since capital ﬂows in or out of small open economies until the return from capital equals
the level set from abroad. The one exception to this statement arises in the case of diﬀerential
changes in corporate tax rates at home and abroad.
More recent contributions have begun to explore the eﬀects of ageing within general
equilibrium, open-economy models. The French INGENUE (2002) team has developed an
OLG model that divides the world into six large regions, three developed and three developing
areas, each of which has quite diﬀerent demographics. They ﬁnd a small negative impact of
ageing on the world interest rate. Boersch-Supan, et. al. (2002) have set up a three-region
OLG model, featuring Germany, Europe, and the rest of the OECD, in order to examine the
international ramiﬁcations of alternative German pension reforms. They ﬁnd very little change
in capital-labor ratios in their open economy simulations.
4In this paper, we also specify and simulate a large open economy model. Our model
features three developed regions – the US, the EU, and Japan. For each region we incorporate
a detailed set of ﬁscal institutions. We also include capital adjustment costs, immigration, age-
speciﬁc fertility rates, life span extension, life span uncertainty, bequests arising from incomplete
annuitization, and intra-cohort heterogeneity. Many of these features have been included in
other studies. But this appears to be the ﬁrst study to include all of these elements in the same
framework.
Like other dynamic life-cycle models featuring fertility, our model features monozygotic
reproduction. But to achieve a realistic pattern of births by age, we follow Kotlikoﬀ, et. al.
(2001) in assuming that agents in their child-bearing years give birth each year to fractions of
children. By specifying how age-speciﬁc fertility rates change through time, we can line up our
model’s age-speciﬁc population counts of children and workers fairly closely with those forecast
for the three regions. To do the same with respect to the population of the elderly, we assume
that agents die with realistic mortality probabilities starting at age 68.
Agents fully appreciate their longevity uncertainty and maximize, at each point in time,
their expected remaining lifetime utilities. The inclusion of lifespan uncertainty provides three
advantages in addition to getting agents to die on time. First, it permits a more realistic
modelling of bequests and inheritances. The standard method for including bequests in dynamic
simulation models is to posit that agents derive utility from leaving bequests. Here we make
no such assumption. Instead, we generate bequests by assuming, realistically, that agents
fail to annuitize their assets in old age. Hence, when they die they leave undesired bequests
to their children. This treatment of bequests ﬁnds support in a recent study by Gokhale,
Kotlikoﬀ, Sefton, and Weale (2001), which shows that a model of undesired bequests and
earnings inequality can closely replicate the U.S. distribution of wealth, including its Gini
coeﬃcient and top tail.
The second advantage involves the age-distributions of bequests and inheritances. With
the exception of De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoroˇ glu, and Sargent (1999), previous modelling of bequests
in dynamic models have assumed that all agents die at a given age and all agents inherit at a
5given age. In our model, agents die at diﬀerent ages, based on realistic mortality probabilities,
and their heirs inherit at diﬀerent ages.
The third advantage of incorporating uninsurable lifespan uncertainty is that it leads
to a gradual decline in consumption in old age. This is a feature of actual longitudinal age-
consumption proﬁles. The other key feature of actual consumption proﬁles is the hump that
appears during child-rearing years. Our model delivers this hump as well since agents in our
model care about their children’s utility when they are young and spend more on consumption
when their kids are at home.
A ﬁnal feature of our framework worth ﬂagging at the outset is the inclusion of capital
adjustment costs. As is well known, these costs can drive temporary wedges between the
marginal products of capital in diﬀerent regions and lead the market values of capital assets to
temporarily diﬀer from their replacement costs. The inclusion of adjustment costs generates
what amounts to regional stock markets and permits us to explore how stock values respond
to aging as well as policy responses to aging.
Our paper begins by describing the demographic transition in the three regions and simu-
lating closed-economy baseline transition paths. We then show how the three closed economies
response to increased immigration and pension privatization. These results provide useful re-
ference points for our subsequent presentation of the open-economy baseline and policy reforms.
Our baseline simulations keep immigration at current levels, incorporate projected in-
creases over time in life expectancy, and maintain current pay-as-you-go ﬁnance of government
retirement and old-age health care beneﬁts. With these baseline results as a reference point, we
consider the macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of two alternative policy reforms – a doubling
of immigration and the privatization of government pension systems, where the payoﬀ of the
accrued liabilities of the existing systems is ﬁnanced by a special consumption tax.
II. Modelling the World Economy
This section discusses the demographic and economic structure of our model. A more de-
tailed description of population projections, data sources, models assumptions, and calibration
6is provided in Fehr, et. al. (2003). To limit notation we suppress regional indices to the extent
possible.
1. Demographic Structure
Each region is populated by households who live up to a maximum age of 90. Conse-
quently, we distinguish up to 91 generations within each period t. The individual life-cycle of
a representative agent is described in Figure 1. Between ages 0 and 20 our agents are children,
who earn no money and are supported by their parents. At age 21 our agents leave their parents
and start working. Between ages 23 and 45 our agents give birth to fractions of children at
the beginning of each period, i.e. the ﬁrst (fraction of) children are born when the parents
are 23 and the last are born when they are age 45. An agent’s ﬁrst-born children (fractions of
children) leave home when the parents are age 43, while the last-born leave their parents when
they are age 66. Our agents die between ages 68 and 90. The probability of death is one at age
91. Children always outlive their parents, meaning that parents always outlive grandparents.
To see this note that if a parent reaches age 90, his or her oldest children will be 67. These are
children who were born when the parent was age 23.
In each year, new immigrants arrive with their children. After crossing the border, im-
migrants automatically become natives in an economic sense, i.e. they have identical wealth
endowments (which we assume they bring with them) to natives in the same age-cohort and
earnings class. They also have the same preferences and fractions of children of diﬀerent ages
as natives in their age-cohort and earnings class.
The starting point for specifying the current and future demographic structure of each
region are the year-2000 existing age-speciﬁc population [N(a,2000)] and age-speciﬁc net-
immigration [NM(a,2000)] structures. To determine the numbers and ages of children alive
in 2000, we used data on birth rates prior to 2000. To determine the evolution over time of
population in each region, we applied region- and age-speciﬁc mortality [d(a,i)] and birth rates
to the cohorts alive in year 2000 as well as to their children as they reach their ages of fertility
and mortality.
7In constructing existing as well as future age-population counts, we have to link each
initial cohort between the ages of 1 and 68 to those of their parents who are still alive. The
reason is that children receive bequests from their parents and the levels and timing of these
inheritances depend on the ages of their parents. This linkage is achieved by applying past
relative fertility rates to each cohort of age 1 to 68 in year 2000. If, for example, 15 percent
of the parents of newborns in 1980 were 25 years old, then 15 percent of the 20-year-olds in
year 2000 are assigned to parents age 45. In addition, each cohort is split into three income
classes k. Speciﬁcally, we assume that 30 percent of each cohort belong to the lowest income
class, 10 percent to the top income class, and the remaining 60 percent to the middle income
class. Formally, we denote the ﬁnal population vector for year 2000 as N(a,2000,s,k)w h e r e
a =1 ,...,90,s=2 3 ,...,45,k=1 ,2,3. The term s references the age of the parent at the
time of birth of agents age a in 2000.
We use the population age structure in year 2000 as well as projected future fertility,
mortality, and net-immigration rates to compute the population vector N(a,t,s,k) for the years
t between 2001 and 2050. After year 2050, mortality rates and net immigration rates are kept
constant and fertility rates are endogenously adjusted in order to achieve a stable population
age structure in the future. In the baseline path, we assume annual net-immigration of 1
million per year in the US, 450,000 in the EU, and 54,000 in Japan. Figures 2 and 3 report our
projected life expectancy and the fertility rates in the three regions between 2000 and 2100.
Our exogenous predictions of the current and future mortality and fertility rates follow
the medium variant of United Nations Population Division (UNPD) (2003). While mortality
is decreasing in all three regions until 2050, the Japanese have a signiﬁcantly higher life ex-
pectancy than Americans or E.U. citizens. Since people don’t die in the model before age 68,
life expectancies at birth are higher than predicted. However, in year 2000 the model’s life
expectancies conditional on reaching age 60 in our model are close to those reported by the
UNDP (2003).
Total fertility rates are currently much higher in the US than in Japan or in Europe.
While the Japanese and European rates are predicted to increase until 2050, the U.S. rates
8remains roughly constant. The drop in the U.S. fertility rate staring in 2050 reﬂects our
assumption of zero population growth in all three regions after that year. In the U.S. the
high rate of immigration requires a reduction in the fertility rate after 2050 to achieve zero
population growth. Figures 4 and 5 report the resulting change in the total population and the
dependency ratio.
Due to its relatively high fertility and immigration rate, the U.S. population increases
from 275 million in 2000 to 505 million in 2100. In Europe, the total population falls over
the century from 375 to 340 million. And in Japan, the population falls from 126 million to
83 million! As one would expect, dependency ratios are increasing in all three regions up to
2050. However, the three regions experience important diﬀerences in their population aging.
First, the increase in the dependency ratio is much greater in Japan and Europe than in the
US. Second, dependency ratios fall in Europe and Japan after peaking in year 2050, while they
remain roughly stable after 2030 in the US.
As agents age, their household compositions change as they have more children and as
older children reach adulthood. These changes materially alter consumption and saving deci-








23 ≤ a ≤ 65,k=1 ,2,3, (1)
where u = max(0;a − 45) and m = min(20,a− 23). Recall that agents younger than 23 have
no children and those over 65 have only adult children, i.e. KID(a,t,k) = 0 for 0 ≤ a ≤ 22
and 66 ≤ a ≤ 90. Agents in between these ages have children. Take, for example, a 30 year-old
agent. Such an agent has children who were born in the years (a − j) in the years since he
was 23. In year t, these children are between age 0 ≤ j ≤ 7. The kids function (1) sums the
total number of kids of the respective parent-income class generation and divides it by the total
number of parents of age a in year t w h ob e l o n gt oi n c o m ec l a s sk. The KID-function (1) takes
into account that the family’s age structure will change over time due to changing fertility. Our
approach also permits the distribution of births by the age of parents to change over time. This
9is an improvement compared to Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001).
2. Preferences and Household Budget Constraints
As previously mentioned, we do not distinguish between natives and immigrants in the
model once the immigrants have joined their domestic earnings- and age-speciﬁc cohorts. The
model’s preference structure is represented by a time-separable, nested CES utility function.
Remaining lifetime utility U(j,t,s,k) of a generation of age j at time t whose parents were age
s at time of birth and who belongs to income class k takes the form
U(j,t,s,k)=V (j,t,s,k)+H(j,t,s,k), (2)
where V (j,t,s,k) records the agent’s utility from her/his own goods and leisure consumption
and H(j,t,s,k) denotes the agent’s utility from the consumption of her/his children. The two



































where c(a,i,s,k)a n d (a,i,s,k) denote consumption and leisure, respectively and i is deﬁned
as i = t+a−j. The children’s consumption of income class k parents who are age a at period
i and whose parents were age s at the time of their birth is deﬁned as cK(a,i,s,k). Note that
the number of children is independent of the grandparents’ age at the time of the birth of the
parents.
Since lifespan is uncertain, the utility of consumption in future periods is weighted with




[1 − d(u,u − a + i)], (5)
which are determined by multiplying the conditional survival probabilities from year t (when
the agents age is j)u pt oy e a ri. Note that d( , ) is the annual mortality probability. The
10parameters θ,ρ,α and γ represent the “pure” rate of time preference, the intratemporal elas-
ticity of substitution between consumption and leisure at each age a, the leisure preference
parameter, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in
diﬀerent years, respectively.
Given the asset endowment a(j,t,s,k) of the agent in year t, maximization of (2) is
subject to a lifetime budget constraint deﬁned by the sequence:




(1 + r(t)) + w(t)E(a,k)[h(a,t) −  (a,t,s,k)]
− T(j,t,s,k) − c(j,t,s,k) − KID(j,t,k)cK(j,t,s,k), (6)
where r(t) is the pretax return on savings and I(j,t,s,k) denotes the inheritance the agent
receives in year t. When the parents die between age 68 and 90, their remaining assets are split
between their children. Consequently, inheritances of agents who are age j in year t and whose
parents were age s at their birth are deﬁned as follows:
I(j,t,s,k)=
d(j + s) ¯ A(j + s,t,k)
45
u=23 N(j + s − u,t,u,k)
. (7)
The numerator deﬁnes the aggregate assets of income class k parents who die in year t at
age j + s. The denominator deﬁnes these parents’ total number of children who are between
ages j + s − 45 and j + s − 23 in year t. The receipt of inheritances requires us to distinguish
members of each cohort according to the ages of their parents at birth. The parents’ ages at
death determine when the children receive their inheritances. While the ﬁrst children of parents
(born when their parents were age 23) receive their inheritances between ages 45 and 67, the
latest born children (born when their parents were age 45) receive their inheritances earlier in
life, between ages 23 and 45.
As in Altig, et. al. (2001) and Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001), we assume that technical progress
causes the time endowment h(·) of each successive generation to grow at the rate λ, i.e.
h(a,i)=( 1+λ)h(a,i − 1). (8)
Gross labor income of the agent in year t is derived as the product of her/his labor supply and
her/his wage rate. The latter is the product of the gross wage rate w(t)i np e r i o dt and the





ξ(1) = 0.2,ξ (2) = 1.0,ξ (3) = 5.0( 9 )
The middle-income class proﬁle is taken from Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 52). The shift
parameters ξ(k) are then applied to derive income class-speciﬁc proﬁles. Moreover, since tech-
nological change is an important determinant of secular growth over the life cycle, we add this
growth by multiplying the age-speciﬁc longitudinal earnings ability proﬁle by the term involv-
ing λ. Hence, the longitudinal age-wage proﬁle is steeper the greater is the rate of technological
change.
The net-taxes T(j,t,s,k) of an agent in year t consist of consumption, capital income,
and progressive wage taxes as well as social security contributions net of pensions. Due to a
contribution ceiling, pension, disability insurance and health-care contribution rates may diﬀer
across agents. Each agent’s pension beneﬁts depend on her pre-retirement earnings history,
while health care and disability transfers are provided on a per capita basis to all eligible age
groups.
Given individual consumption, leisure, and asset levels of all agents, we can compute the















Since households die at the beginning of each period, we have to aggregate across all agents
who lived in the previous period in order to compute ¯ A(a +1 ,t+1 ,k), which we need for the








a(a,t +1 ,s,k)N(a,t +1 ,s,k) (11)
assets of the arriving immigrants of period t + 1 are included.









E(a,k)[h(a,t) −  (a,t,s,k)]N(a,t,s,k). (12)
3. The Government Sector
The consolidated government issues new debt ∆B(t) and collects net-taxes from house-










With respect to public debt, we assume that the government maintains an exogenously ﬁxed
ratio of debt to output. The progressivity of the wage tax system is modelled as in Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Speciﬁcally, marginal wage tax rates rise linearly with the tax base.
PY(t) deﬁnes the aggregate payroll tax base which diﬀers from total labor earnings due
to the ceiling on taxable wages. This ceiling is ﬁxed at twice average income in the US and
EU and at 168 percent of average income in Japan. Aggregate average social security payroll
tax rates ˆ τp, ˆ τh and ˆ τd are computed each period from the relevant budget constraint for the
program and region in question. For the U.S., we determine the values of three payroll tax rates




h(t)PY(t)=HB(t)a n dˆ τ
d(t)PY(t)=DB(t) (14)
where PB(t),HB(t)a n dDB(t) are total outlays of the pension, health care, and disability
systems, respectively. In the EU and Japan, disability insurance is part of their respective
state pension systems. Hence, we do not calculate separate disability insurance payroll tax
rates for those regions.
Due to the contribution ceiling, individual pension and health insurance payroll tax rates
can diﬀer from the payroll tax rate. Above the contribution ceiling, marginal social security
13contributions are zero and average social security contributions fall with the agent’s income. To
accommodate this non convexity of the budget constraint, we assume that the highest earnings
class in each region pay pension and, in the EU and Japan, health insurance payroll taxes up
to the relevant ceilings, but, at the margin, face no pension and no health care payroll taxes.
The other earnings classes are assumed to face the full statutory rate on all earnings. In the
U.S., the disability payroll tax is modelled in an equivalent manner. However, since there is
no ceiling on U.S. Medicare taxes, all earnings groups are assumed to face the health insurance
payroll tax at the margin.
If a k-income class agent, whose parents were s years old at his birth, retires in year z at
the exogenously set retirement age ¯ a(z), her/his pension beneﬁts Pen(a,i,s,k)i ny e a r si ≥ z
when he is age a ≥ ¯ a(z) depend linearly on her/his average earnings during his working time
¯ W(z,s,k):
Pen(a,i,s,k)=ω0 + ω1 × ¯ W(z,s,k). (15)
The region-speciﬁc parameters ω0,ω 1 were chosen in order to approximate the replacement
rates relative to individual lifetime earnings as reported in Whitehouse (2002, 55).
General government expenditures G(t) consist of government purchases of goods and ser-
vices, including educational expenditures and health outlays. Over the transition, government
purchases of goods and services are held ﬁxed per capita with an adjustment for annual tech-
nological change. Age-speciﬁc education, health, and disability outlays are also held ﬁxed over
the transition with the same adjustment for technological change. The government’s budget
(13) is balanced each year by adjusting the intercept on our linear formula for the average wage
tax rate.
4. The Production Side
The economy is populated by a large number of identical ﬁrms, the sum total of which





14where K(t) is aggregate capital in period t, ε is capital’s share in production, and φ is a
technology parameter. Since we posit convex capital adjustment cost, the ﬁrms’ marketable
output in year t, Y (t), is given by the diﬀerence between gross output and adjustment costs,
i.e.
Y (t)=F(K(t),L(t)) − 0.5 ψ ∆K(t)
2/K(t) (17)
where ∆K(t) measures investment in year t. The term ψ is the adjustment cost coeﬃcient.
Larger values of ψ imply greater marginal costs of new capital goods for a given rate of invest-
ment. The installation technology is linear homogeneous and shows increasing marginal cost
of investment (or, symmetrically, disinvestment): faster adjustment requires a greater than
proportional rise in adjustment costs.
We abstract from any taxation at the corporate level. Arbitrage between new and existing
capital, therefore, implies that the latter has a price per unit of
q(t +1 )=1+ψ ∆K(t)/K(t) (18)
Similarly, the arbitrage condition arising from proﬁt maximization requires identical re-
turns to ﬁnancial and real investments.
r(t)q(t)=FK(t) +0 .5 ψ (∆K(t)/K(t))
2 + q(t +1 )− q(t) (19)
The left side gives the return on a ﬁnancial investment of amount q(t) while the return on one
unit of real capital investment is the net return to capital (which includes the marginal product
of capital FK(t) plus the reduction in marginal adjustment costs) and capital gains.
5. World Equilibrium
Up to now we’ve described the model for the representative economy. Since we assume
no migration between our three regions, the closed economy capital market equates national
asset holdings from (11) to the sum of the market values of the domestic capital stock and the
outstanding stock of government debt. In the open economy case, the aggregate value of world










with W = {US,EU,Japan}. (20)
6. Solving the Model
In order to solve the model we ﬁrst need to specify the preference, technology, and pol-
icy parameters. Table 1 reports our main parameter values. The preference and technology
parameters are mostly taken from Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001). The reported debt levels in USA,
Europe and Japan were chosen to match real interest payments reported in European Commis-
sion (2003) for the year 2000, while the retirement ages are taken from Bloendal and Scarpetta
(1999) for the US and EU and from Whitehouse (2002) for Japan. The consumption tax rate
for the US is taken from Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001). For the EU, the consumption tax rate is the
unweighted average of the indirect tax rates in the member states, and the Japanese consump-
tion tax rate is set at the current value of the VAT. In addition, we specify the progressive
parameters of the wage tax systems in each region in order to generate realistic average and
marginal tax rates (reported below), while the proportional term is computed endogenously so
that the government budget is balanced by the wage tax.
In calibrating our model, we use a Japanese age-speciﬁc government health care expen-
ditures proﬁles for Japan. In the case of the E.U., we use the German proﬁle. For the US,
the Medicare program applies only to households older than 65. We assume uniform Medicare
expenditures by age among those over age 65. We make the same uniform age-distribution
assumption with respect to the U.S. disability system, which we assume applies to only those
under age 65.
We use the German age-speciﬁc education proﬁle for all regions in the model and rescale
it to get realistic education outlays in year 2000 in each region (see below). In addition to these
parameter values, our model requires an initial distribution of assets by age and income class
for each region. These proﬁles are region-speciﬁc.1
1Data on Japanese asset proﬁles were provided by Charles Horioka, while the European proﬁles were adjusted
16To run our model as an open world economy, we also need to specify how aggregate world
assets are distributed across regions. These world asset shares were chosen to generate realistic
current accounts vis a vis the other regions for our initial year. Finally, we have to specify
the capital stocks in each region in our initial year 2000 in each region. Here we take the
endogenous initial-year values that arise from a simulation without adjustment costs.
Given the initial world capital stock and asset proﬁles, our model applies a Gauss-Seidel
algorithm to solve for the perfect foresight general equilibrium transition path of the economy.
Our algorithm starts with initial guesses for the capital stocks and labor supplies in each
region for the remaining years of the transition. Next we compute from equation (18) the
path of region-speciﬁc market prices of capital. The path for the world interest rate after 2000
is derived from the arbitrage condition (19) for the U.S. This condition (19) is also used to
update values of the existing capital stock in year 2000 in each region. Next, the wage rates are
computed in each region which are equal to the respective marginal products of labor. From
the capital market equilibrium condition (20) we derive aggregate initial asset holdings in year
2000, apply the region-speciﬁc saving shares and update age-speciﬁc asset holdings in 2000 in
each region. Given these initial assets, the time path of tax rates (which are based on guesses
in the ﬁrst iteration) and factor prices, household decisions on consumption and labor supply
are computed and aggregated. Then we update the path for wage tax rates, the social security
payroll tax rate, and debt given the government budget constraints (13) and (14). Finally, we
compute new paths for the capital stocks in each region using the capital market equilibrium
condition (20) as well as (18). The new values for capital and labor are then weighted with
the initial guesses of these supplies to form guesses of the time paths of these variables. The
algorithm then iterates until the path of capital stock and labor converges. We give our economy
300 years to reach to a steady state. Our model in fact reaches a steady state to many decimal
places prior to year 300. It also converges very tightly around the equilibrium transition path.
from German data provided by Reinhold Schnabel. US Data were derived from the 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finances.
17III. Initial Equilibrium and Baseline Path in the Case of Closed Economies
First, our model is solved by treating every region as a closed economy. Table 2 reports
the macroeconomic variables in 2000 in the three regions. Note that there is a fairly close accor-
dance between actual and computed national income account measures of private consumption
and government purchases. The one exception here is with respect to Japanese government
purchases. The oﬃcial data seem too high given the oﬃcial reported ratio of tax revenues to
national income. In our calibration, we chose to benchmark against the ratio of tax revenues
to national income.
The reported shares in education, pensions and health are very close to actual levels2.
The same applies to the social security payroll tax rates and the level and progressivity of
the income tax in the US and EU. On the other hand, the average wage tax rate in Japan is
obviously too high. Since we have assumed a fairly low consumption tax rate in Japan (see
table 1), tax revenues from indirect taxes are too low in Japan3. Finally, the model’s year-2000
capital-output ratios seem reasonable.
Next we turn to the baseline paths of the economies where we assume that current pension
systems and other government policies are maintained. The transition paths for the three closed
economies are reported in the ﬁrst parts of tables 3 to 5.
The tables demonstrate that the three regions face quite diﬀerent future dynamics. At the
ﬁrst glance, it might seem strange that the eﬀective labor supply in all three regions is rising
steadily although the economies are aging. This is mainly due to the assumed labor-augmenting
technical progress. It more than oﬀsets the future reduction in the labor force reported above
(see ﬁgure 4) in the EU and Japan and substantially augments project growth in the actual
number of workers in the US. Consequently, while the Japanese labor supply only increases by
76 percent over the next 100 years, the European eﬀective labor supply more than doubles, and
the US eﬀective labor supply increases by more than a factor of ﬁve.
2See European Commission (2003), Dang et al. (2001, 26), IPSS (2003, 3) and OECD (2002, 178 and 2003).
3In future research we plan to improve this calibration.
18The transition paths of capital stocks also diﬀer dramatically across the regions. The
capital stock rises steadily in the US and more than doubles in the long run. But it falls in the
EU and Japan. The key ﬁnding here is that capital per unit of human capital declines in all
three regions; i.e., the general equilibrium dynamic transition path entails a long-run capital
shortage. The reason for this crowding out of capital is the reduction in saving associated with
the rise over time in taxes, particularly payroll taxes. Over the course of the century, the capital
shortages lower real wages per unit of human capital by 17 percent in the U.S., by 22 percent in
the E.U., and by 19 percent in Japan. This decline in real wages implies even higher payroll and
wage tax rates (used to ﬁnance general government expenditures) than demographic changes,
by themselves, would suggest.
The crowding out of capital also portends dramatic long-run increases in real interest
rates in all three regions. This increase is greatest in Europe where interest rates rise over the
century from 9.0 percent to 15.6 percent. In Japan rates rise from 9.0 percent to 12.2 percent.
In addition to these increases in interest rates, there are major long-run increases in the market
values of capital in all three regions. In the U.S. stock values rise over the century by 16.7
percent. The corresponding European and Japanese long-term capital gains are 15.8 percent
and 11.2 percent. However, in contrast to the steady increase over time in interest rates, share
valuations don’t rise continuously over the transition.
Social security payroll tax rates and wage tax rates are reported in the right columns.
As one would expect from the population dynamics described above (see ﬁgure 5), the largest
increase in payroll tax rates in the medium run occurs in Japan where they double from 24.7
percent to 48.1 percent in the next 50 years. While the EU payroll tax rates are currently
higher than in Japan, their future increase is somewhat less pronounced, and they peak at 45.5
percent. After 2050, contribution rates fall again slightly in both regions. Due to its less severe
population ageing, social security payroll tax rates rise much less in the US from 13.7 percent
in 2000 to 23.4 percent in 2030 and further to 25.8 percent in the long-run.
The picture is very similar in the case of wage tax rates. Due to the generous public
good expenditures per capita in the EU, the average wage tax rate has to increase steadily over
19the whole transition in order to balance the budget. While the current level is 13.7 percent it
almost doubles in the long run, reaching 26.8 percent. In Japan the wage tax rate rises from
14.2 percent to 23.6 percent. In the US, public expenditures per capita are lower than in Japan
or the EU. Hence, the U.S. wage tax rate, which equals 10.1 percent in 2000 peaks at 16.0
percent in 2075 and falls to 15.5 percent by the end of the century.
To summarize, our closed-economy, baseline policy simulations show very severe deterio-
ration in macroeconomic and ﬁscal conditions in all three regions. In the long run, the combined
values of payroll and average wage tax rates exceed 40 percent in the U.S. and 60 percent in
Japan and the E.U.
IV. Macroeconomic and Welfare Eﬀects of Policy Reforms in the Closed Economies
In this section, we consider two policy reforms. The ﬁrst involves doubling immigra-
tion in every region. The second involves privatizing the pension system. We highlight the
consequences of these policy reforms for the transition paths of each region’s macroeconomic
variables and levels of welfare.
1. Doubling Immigration
First we consider a doubling of immigration in each region starting in 2001 and continuing
through 2050. This means that every year over the next half century the US experiences
immigration of 2 million people, the EU of 900,000 people, and Japan of 108,000 people.
As tables 3 through 5 indicate, doubling immigration has non-negligible eﬀects on macroe-
conomic variables and tax rates in all three regions. The increase in the eﬀective labor supply
occurs gradually. Since immigrants arrive with assets, the capital stock eﬀects are quantita-
tively quite similar and, consequently, factor prices are almost constant. In the medium and
long run, capital prices increase while payroll and wage tax rates fall signiﬁcantly in all three
regions.
However, the quantitative impact of immigration policy is quite diﬀerent in the three
regions. In the U.S., the eﬀective labor supply in 2030 is [(210-185)/185] 13.5 percent larger,
20while in year 2100 it is [(686-526)/526] 30 percent larger than in the baseline path. Payroll and
wage taxes, on the other hand, fall during the same years from 37.5 percent and 41.3 percent
in the baseline path to 35.8 percent and 40.2 percent, respectively.
In Europe, immigration is lower than in the U.S. Consequently, doubling immigration in
Europe has a smaller eﬀect on the macroeconomy. In the years 2030 and 2100 eﬀective labor
supply only increases by 6.5 percent and 21 percent, respectively. However, Europe beneﬁts
more from immigration due to its more severe population aging. Payroll and wage taxes fall
in 2030 from 59.2 percentage points to 57.5 percentage points and in 2100 from 68 percentage
points to 65 percentage points.
In Japan, immigration is very modest. Doubling immigration increases the eﬀective labor
supply in 2030 only by 2.5 percent and in year 2100 only by about 10 percent. Therefore, the
impact on payroll and wage taxes is also modest. In the years 2030 and 2100 they fall from 68.5
to 67.8 percentage points and from 63.8 to 62.4 percentage points, respectively. Note, however,
that the long-run reduction of both taxes combined is 1.4 percentage points in Japan whereas
it is more modest in the U.S. where they are reduced by 1.1 percentage points.
The welfare eﬀects of the immigration policy are reported in Table 6. The numbers show
the change in welfare measured as a percentage of remaining lifetime resources. In all three
regions the existing elderly experience small welfare gains from immigration due to the rise
in capital prices. Younger and future generations are better oﬀ due to the fall in wage and
payroll tax rates. Note that the welfare gains for cohorts born in 2030 are strongest in Europe,
smaller in Japan and lowest in the U.S. In Europe, the very distortive tax rates are reduced in
the long run by 3 percentage points. In Japan, the long run reduction is only 1.4 percentage
points. In the U.S. the long run reduction is even lower, and in addition the distortions of the
baseline system are much smaller compared to Europe and Japan. This explains the welfare
diﬀerences between the three regions. Of course, in all three regions rich households beneﬁt
from the reform less since their income is above the contribution ceiling.
212. Privatizing Pensions
Our pension privatization reform eliminates existing public pension systems at the margin,
while still paying successive retires all those beneﬁts they accrued under the existing system.
This reform is modelled in the following way: Pension beneﬁts of initial retirees are paid in
full, and beneﬁts for new retirees are phased out linearly over a 45-year period starting in
2000. Furthermore, the contribution rate to the pension system is eliminated, and transitional
beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a new consumption tax.
In the US, this additional consumption tax rate is initially 7.9 percent. It rises to a
maximum value of 8.7 percent in 2020 and gradually declines thereafter. After 2071 the added
tax is zero. The U.S. payroll tax rate declines immediately by 8.9 percentage points. Over the
transition, the payroll tax rate rises by 2.4 percentage points since expenses for health care and
disability insurance grow. In the EU, the added consumption tax rate has an initial value of
16.9 percent. It then rises to a maximum value of 18 percent in 2012 and then declines. The
additional tax is zero after 2074. Because of this reform, the payroll tax is reduced by 17.2
percentage points in year 2000 and rises to a maximum of 11.4 percent in 2050. In Japan, the
consumption tax rate is initially 14.2 percent. It then rises to a maximum of 18.3 percent in
2014 before declining. As in the EU, the targeted consumption tax is zero after 2074. The
payroll tax, however, is 16.8 percentage points lower in 2000. And the maximum value reached
is 11.8 percent in 2050.
Of course, since part of the tax burden is shifted from payroll taxes towards consumption
taxes, the burden on younger households falls and that on the elderly rises. The intergener-
ational redistribution associated with the consumption tax depresses aggregate consumption,
which permits an increase in national saving and capital formation. The long-run consequences
of this reform are dramatic in all three regions. Relative to the base case simulations, the year
2100 capital stock increases by 62.9 percent in the U.S., by 163.5 percent in the E.U., and by
149.3 percent in Japan. The higher capital stocks increase gross wages which rise until 2100 by
[(94-83)/83] 13 percent in the US, by [(101-78)/78] 29 percent in Europe and [(104-81)/81] 28
percent in Japan. The combination of higher gross wages and reduced payroll and wage taxes
22boosts net wages especially in Europe and Japan. They almost triple from 0.25 [0.78(1-0.68)]
to 0.75 [1.01(1-0.25)] in Europe and from 0.30 [0.81(1-0.64)] to 0.78 [1.04(1-0.25)] in Japan.
The reductions in labor supplies in the three regions, reported in tables 3 to 5, are a direct
consequence of the positive income eﬀects experienced by younger generations. Finally, capital
accumulation drives up capital valuations in all economies and leads to lower year 2100 interest
rates.
However, the advantageous macroeconomic eﬀects of privatization come at a cost, which is
shown in table 7. The privatization reform implies a strong redistribution from older generations
in all three economies towards younger and future generations. Again, the intergenerational
and intragenerational redistribution is less severe in the US compared to the EU and Japan.
The elderly are hurt because a large part of the ﬁnancing burden of the pension system is shifted
towards them via the consumption tax. However, welfare losses for the elderly in the highest
income class are quite small. This is due to the fact that our policy reform leads to an enormous
increase in the initial capital prices. Elderly people in the highest income class gain the most
from this higher valuation so that their overall welfare losses are quite modest compared to
middle-income and poor elderly. Younger and future generations beneﬁt enormously from such
a policy. In Europe and Japan, which face larger long-run ﬁnancing problems, long-run welfare
almost doubles compared with the base-line path.
V. Initial Equilibrium and Baseline Path in the Case of Open Economies
Next we turn to the case of open economies. The calibration of the simulation model is
the same as for closed economies. However, we now have to give each region an initial share
of total world assets. These shares, taken from the closed economy case, are 35 percent for the
US, 48.4 percent for the EU, and 16.4 percent for Japan. Since in the open economy model
the interest rate path is quite diﬀerent, the macroeconomic structure even in the year 2000 will
change. Table 8, however, shows that the diﬀerences compared to table 2 are fairly small.
The macroeconomic structures of the open economies are almost the same as those of the
closed economies. However, some diﬀerences are worth mentioning. National income is now
23lower in the EU and slightly higher in the US and Japan. Consequently, wage taxes are now
higher in the EU and slightly lower in US and Japan compared to the closed economy case. In
Japan, the current account shows a 3.1 percent surplus in 2000. The EU current account is in
deﬁcit, but its size – 1.2 percent of national income – is smaller than that of Japan. The U.S.
current account, in contrast, shows a small year-2000 surplus. In considering these values, bear
in mind that our model does not include trade with China, South East Asian, and the rest of
the world outside of our three regions.
Next we compare the macroeconomic variables during the transition in the open and
closed economy. In the closed economy baseline, interest rates increased the most in the EU
and the least in the US (see tables 3 to 5). Consequently, in the open economy capital will
predominantly ﬂow from the US economy towards the EU. The baseline path of the open
economy, therefore, shows for the US (table 9) less and for the EU (table 10) more capital
accumulation than in the respective closed economy cases. Japan experiences initially capital
outﬂows, which change to inﬂows in the long run. Due to these capital ﬂows, the US and Japan
experience short-run current account surpluses while the EU faces current account deﬁcits. In
the US and Japan, the wage tax rate increases are reduced slightly during the transition while
they increase slightly in the EU (compared to the closed economy).
The initial current account deﬁcit in the EU turns into a temporary surplus in the medium
run. The more dramatic aging process in the EU and Japan will reverse the capital ﬂows in the
medium run so that the US will experience capital inﬂows. The high net foreign debt, however,
prevents the current account from returning to surplus again.
Finally, the world interest rate rises until 2075 and then falls slightly thereafter. The level
is somewhere in the middle of the closed economy levels for the U.S. and the E.U.
VI. Macroeconomic and Welfare Eﬀects of Policy Reforms in the Open Economies
Now we consider again the consequences of doubling immigration and privatizing the
retirement system.
241. Doubling of Immigration
The economic adjustment after a doubling of immigration is very similar to the case of
the closed economies. However, due to capital ﬂows, additional immigration now has a diﬀerent
impact on the world interest rate. Whereas the reduction in interest rates is weaker in Europe,
it is stronger in U.S. and Japan compared to the closed economy case. As a consequence,
capital income taxes fall less in Europe, progressive wage taxes increase less compared to the
closed economy. Comparing tables 6 and 12 reveals that in Europe future agents in the top
(low and middle) income class are better (worse) oﬀ than before. Exactly the opposite happens
in the U.S and Japan.
Interestingly, the the initially elderly in the EU and Japan beneﬁt more from the doubling
of immigration in the open economy than in a closed economy. The opposite happens in the
U.S. The reason is the region-speciﬁc capital price reaction after the policy reform. Whereas
in the U.S. capital prices increase by 12 percent on impact, they increase in Europe only by
3 percent and in Japan they even fall slightly. In the closed economy, the domestic elderly
beneﬁt only from the increase in their domestic asset prices. In the open economy, however,
the region-speciﬁc asset shares are identical across all households. Consequently, European and
Japanese elderly beneﬁt from the strong increase of U.S. assets in the same way as native U.S.
savers and vice versa.
2. Privatizing Pensions
Next, we simulate the privatization of the existing pension systems in an open economy.
Not surprisingly, the consequences are again very similar to those in the closed economy.
In the US, the consumption tax increases slightly less in the open than in the closed
economy, whereas in Europe the consumption tax increases slightly more in the open economy.
The reason is that privatization has a stronger positive eﬀect on wages in the open US economy
compared to the closed US economy, while the opposite applies in the EU and Japan. Finally,
the drop in the interest rate due to privatization is greater in the open than in the closed US
economy. In Europe and Japan exactly the opposite happens.
25The main thing to note, however, are the huge long-run welfare gains experienced by
future low- and middle-income agents from the simulated privatization reform. In the EU, for
example, future low-income agents experience a 90.44 percent welfare gain. In Japan and the
U.S. the comparable ﬁgures are 83.51 percent and 32.95 percent, respectively.
The open economy welfare eﬀects are quite similar to the closed economy eﬀects, but
some diﬀerences should also be mentioned. In the U.S. the elderly lose more in the closed
compared to the open economy while the opposite happens in Europe and Japan. This is due
to the above-mentioned changes in consumption tax rates. On the other hand, the long run
intragenerational redistribution favors the European top income class in the open economy more
than in the closed economy. The opposite happens in the US. Again, this is due to the long
run interest rate which decreases less (more) in the open economy EU (U.S.) and consequently
progressive wage taxes are lower (higher).
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we presented a new dynamic simulation model to analyze the general equilib-
rium impact of ageing in the world’s three major industrialized regions. Our simulation results
show that ageing will greatly damage the U.S., EU, and Japanese economies by crowding out
those region’s capital stocks. This capital shortage lowers real wages by 19 percent and raises
real interest rates by over 400 basis points.
However, ageing is not identical in all three areas considered. It is most profound in
Japan and Europe and less dramatic in the US. Consequently, the macroeconomic impacts of
ageing under baseline policy are quite diﬀerent in the three regions. These diﬀerences in the
aging process cause capital to ﬂow from the U.S. to EU and Japan in our baseline path. Stated
diﬀerently, the U.S. capital shortage is exacerbated by the need to supply capital to Japan and
the European Union.
Although a doubling of immigration has some beneﬁcial macroeconomic eﬀects, they are
extremely small. On the other hand, one can expect a signiﬁcant long-run welfare improve-
ment from eliminating current pension systems and ﬁnancing accrued pension rights with an
26earmarked consumption tax. While the welfare losses of initial elderly and middle aged are
modest, the welfare gains for younger and future low and middle income generations are ex-
traordinarily large.
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Figure 3: Total fertility (birth per woman)
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Table 1: Parameter values of the Model
Symbol USA EU Japan
Utility function
time preference rate θ 0.02
intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.25
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 0.4
leisure preference parameter α 1.5
Production function
technology level φ 1.05461
capital share in production ε 0.25
adjustment cost parameter ψ 10.0
technical progress λ 0.01
Policy parameters
consumption tax rate (in percent) 11.3 19.5 5.0
capital tax rate (in percent) 20.0
debt (in percent of national income) B/Y 40 50 44
age of retirement 63 60 60
30Table 2: The year 2000 of the baseline path with closed economies*
Model Oﬃcial**
USA EU Japan USA EU Japan
National Income
private consumption 77.6 69.5 78.5 77.6 67.8 67.8
government purchases of goods and services 23.0 32.4 22.7 23.0 32.1 33.4
national saving rate 2.8 4.4 4.1 2.8 6.3 5.6
Government indicators
aggregate education outlays 5.9 5.9 4.4 5.9 6.0 4.3
aggregate pension beneﬁts 5.9 11.4 10.8 5.7 11.6 10.8
aggregate health beneﬁts 2.1 6.3 5.3 2.5 6.2 6.8
aggregate disability beneﬁts 1.3 - - 0.9 - -
pension contribution rate (in %) 8.9 16.9 16.6 10.6 - 17.3
health care contribution rate (in %) 2.9 9.5 8.1 2.9 - 8.0
disability insurance contribution rate (in %) 1.9 - - 1.9 - -
interest payment on public debt 3.6 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.0
Tax revenues 22.5 30.0 21.0 26.6 32.5 20.7
direct taxes 13.7 16.4 17.0 17.9 16.5 10.5
indirect taxes 8.8 13.6 4.0 8.7 16.0 10.2
Wage tax rates (in %)
average 10.1 13.7 14.2
marginal 17.1 19.3 20.3
capital output ratio 3.2 3.2 3.3
interest rate (in %) 9.0 -
*in percent of national income if not stated diﬀerent ** European Commission (2003)
31Table 3: Simulation results for the US (closed economy)
Eﬀective Before- OASHDI Average
National Capital Labor Tax Capital Interest Cost Wage
Year Income Stock Supply Wage Price Rate Rate Tax
Base Case 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.000 .090 .137 .101
2005 1.10 1.00 1.13 0.97 1.048 .092 .137 .106
2010 1.20 1.02 1.27 0.95 1.086 .093 .149 .109
2020 1.42 1.10 1.55 0.92 1.109 .091 .192 .125
2030 1.64 1.17 1.85 0.89 1.078 .105 .234 .141
2050 2.18 1.34 2.59 0.85 1.125 .118 .239 .159
2075 3.13 1.75 3.83 0.82 1.160 .126 .246 .160
2100 4.32 2.45 5.26 0.83 1.167 .122 .258 .155
Doubling 2000 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.012 .090 .137 .099
immigration 2005 1.13 1.01 1.16 0.97 1.063 .092 .137 .104
2010 1.25 1.04 1.33 0.94 1.105 .094 .145 .108
2020 1.53 1.14 1.69 0.91 1.136 .093 .183 .125
2030 1.84 1.25 2.10 0.88 1.114 .107 .218 .140
2050 2.61 1.55 3.12 0.84 1.163 .117 .225 .157
2075 3.96 2.18 4.87 0.82 1.186 .126 .237 .156
2100 5.65 3.21 6.86 0.83 1.184 .119 .254 .148
Privatizing 2000 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.051 .090 .048 .098
pensions 2005 1.11 1.03 1.14 0.98 1.104 .087 .048 .101
2010 1.22 1.08 1.28 0.96 1.143 .086 .049 .102
2020 1.46 1.23 1.56 0.95 1.171 .081 .058 .112
2030 1.72 1.39 1.85 0.93 1.153 .087 .068 .120
2050 2.34 1.84 2.56 0.92 1.186 .087 .068 .124
2075 3.41 2.68 3.74 0.92 1.194 .088 .070 .117
2100 4.75 3.99 5.10 0.94 1.189 .081 .072 .108
3
2Table 4: Simulation results for the EU (closed economy)
Eﬀective Before- Social Average
National Capital Labor Tax Capital Interest Security Wage
Year Income Stock Supply Wage Price Rate Cost Rate Tax
Base Case 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.000 .090 .264 .137
2005 1.06 0.98 1.09 0.97 1.035 .096 .273 .140
2010 1.12 0.97 1.18 0.95 1.066 .096 .288 .143
2020 1.22 0.99 1.32 0.93 1.095 .094 .331 .156
2030 1.27 0.99 1.39 0.92 1.044 .097 .407 .185
2050 1.38 0.89 1.61 0.86 1.009 .130 .455 .231
2075 1.62 0.84 2.02 0.80 1.087 .153 .430 .262
2100 2.04 0.96 2.62 0.78 1.159 .156 .412 .268
Doubling 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.002 .090 .264 .137
immigration 2005 1.07 0.98 1.10 0.97 1.039 .097 .272 .139
2010 1.14 0.97 1.20 0.95 1.073 .097 .284 .142
2020 1.26 1.00 1.37 0.92 1.107 .095 .324 .155
2030 1.34 1.01 1.48 0.91 1.060 .100 .391 .184
2050 1.54 0.97 1.80 0.86 1.047 .128 .431 .226
2075 1.91 0.98 2.39 0.80 1.117 .150 .409 .253
2100 2.48 1.19 3.18 0.78 1.180 .150 .398 .253
Privatizing 2000 1.02 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.090 .090 .092 .132
pensions 2005 1.09 1.02 1.11 0.97 1.135 .087 .093 .131
2010 1.16 1.07 1.19 0.97 1.174 .084 .094 .129
2020 1.29 1.20 1.32 0.97 1.215 .075 .098 .129
2030 1.38 1.36 1.39 0.99 1.187 .069 .106 .141
2050 1.56 1.63 1.55 1.01 1.157 .069 .114 .149
2075 1.89 2.00 1.87 1.01 1.163 .070 .109 .148
2100 2.42 2.53 2.39 1.01 1.180 .069 .106 .142
3
3Table 5: Simulation results for Japan (closed economy)
Eﬀective Before- Social Average
National Capital Labor Tax Capital Interest Security Wage
Year Income Stock Supply Wage Price Rate Cost Rate Tax
Base Case 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.000 .090 .247 .142
2005 1.04 0.99 1.06 0.98 1.031 .085 .273 .146
2010 1.07 0.98 1.10 0.97 1.026 .081 .313 .155
2020 1.11 0.95 1.17 0.95 1.012 .092 .363 .167
2030 1.12 0.92 1.20 0.93 1.004 .093 .403 .182
2050 1.12 0.82 1.24 0.90 0.959 .108 .481 .214
2075 1.19 0.69 1.43 0.83 1.041 .136 .431 .231
2100 1.42 0.75 1.76 0.81 1.116 .138 .402 .236
Doubling 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.000 .090 .247 .142
immigration 2005 1.04 0.99 1.06 0.98 1.031 .085 .272 .146
2010 1.07 0.98 1.11 0.97 1.028 .081 .312 .154
2020 1.13 0.95 1.19 0.95 1.016 .093 .359 .166
2030 1.15 0.93 1.23 0.93 1.010 .095 .397 .181
2050 1.17 0.84 1.31 0.90 0.976 .108 .468 .211
2075 1.29 0.74 1.55 0.83 1.056 .135 .419 .228
2100 1.57 0.84 1.94 0.81 1.129 .135 .394 .230
Privatizing 2000 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.087 .090 .079 .135
pensions 2005 1.06 1.03 1.07 1.00 1.125 .076 .084 .138
2010 1.09 1.07 1.10 1.00 1.128 .071 .089 .142
2020 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.00 1.141 .073 .100 .142
2030 1.22 1.28 1.20 1.02 1.152 .064 .105 .145
2050 1.26 1.49 1.19 1.06 1.085 .058 .118 .157
2075 1.38 1.61 1.31 1.06 1.097 .063 .108 .154
2100 1.67 1.87 1.62 1.04 1.125 .065 .101 .153
3
4Table 6: Welfare eﬀects of doubling immigration
(closed economy case)
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 123123 123
1910 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
1920 0.33 0.26 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
1930 0.39 0.32 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02
1940 0.43 0.38 0.29 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05
1950 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.07
1960 -0.11 0.08 0.20 0.03 0.10 0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.06
1970 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.06
1980 0.41 0.34 0.16 0.34 0.31 0.16 0.22 0.20 0.06
1990 0.56 0.46 0.13 1.23 0.97 0.17 0.58 0.48 0.08
2000 0.98 0.80 0.24 2.53 2.06 0.32 1.18 0.98 0.13
2010 1.18 0.96 0.30 4.23 3.59 0.56 1.98 1.70 0.20
2020 1.17 0.94 0.30 5.33 4.61 0.74 2.66 2.34 0.28
2030 1.54 1.18 0.45 6.06 5.20 0.94 3.03 2.63 0.35
Table 7: Welfare eﬀects of privatizing pensions
(closed economy case)
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 123 123 123
1910 -3.86 -2.13 -0.59 -7.10 -2.90 -0.58 -5.70 -1.88 -0.28
1920 -4.12 -2.26 -0.65 -9.47 -5.55 -2.28 -9.22 -5.09 -1.61
1930 -4.71 -2.80 -0.94 -10.16 -6.30 -2.92 -10.32 -5.77 -1.85
1940 -6.60 -3.99 -1.49 -10.89 -6.76 -2.89 -11.50 -7.38 -3.31
1950 -6.28 -3.83 -1.72 -8.45 -6.01 -3.35 -8.98 -6.05 -3.28
1960 -3.11 -2.03 -1.67 -2.37 -2.13 -3.27 -1.46 -1.04 -3.11
1970 1.09 0.93 -1.04 4.02 2.62 -2.46 5.02 3.81 -2.41
1980 4.40 3.28 -0.18 11.56 8.58 -0.42 12.06 9.32 -0.81
1990 9.60 6.88 0.91 23.61 17.10 1.78 24.00 18.05 1.10
2000 15.95 11.35 2.48 42.58 30.60 4.82 40.65 29.67 3.54
2010 21.58 15.21 4.04 64.76 46.52 8.35 60.22 43.60 6.22
2020 26.01 18.19 5.33 82.65 58.96 11.37 76.79 55.32 8.51
2030 29.37 20.43 6.31 94.50 66.88 13.62 85.03 60.62 9.95
35Table 8: The year 2000 of the baseline path with open economies*
USA EU Japan
National Income
private consumption 77.4 69.4 78.7
government purchases of goods and services 22.8 32.9 22.4
current account 0.2 -1.2 3.1
national saving rate 3.1 4.1 4.1
Government indicators
aggregate education outlays 5.9 6.0 4.4
aggregate pension beneﬁts 5.9 11.4 10.8
aggregate health beneﬁts 2.1 6.4 5.2
aggregate disability beneﬁts 1.3 - -
pension contribution rate (in %) 8.8 16.9 16.5
health care contribution rate (in %) 2.8 9.6 8.0
disability insurance contribution rate (in %) 1.9 - -
interest payment on publicdebt 3.6 4.5 4.0
Tax revenues 22.3 30.3 20.9
wage tax 7.3 10.5 10.5
capital tax 6.3 6.3 6.5
consumption tax 8.7 13.5 3.9
Wage tax rates (in %)
average 10.0 14.2 14.1
marginal 17.0 19.7 20.2
capital output ratio 3.2 3.2 3.3
interest rate (in %) 9.0
* in percent of national income
36Table 9: Simulation results for the US (open economy)
Eﬀective Before- OASHDI Average
National Capital Labor Current Tax Capital Interest Cost Wage
Year Income Stock Supply Account Wage Price Rate Rate Tax
Base Case 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 .002 1.00 1.000 .090 .135 .100
2005 1.10 1.00 1.13 .002 0.97 1.046 .093 .137 .103
2010 1.20 1.02 1.27 .003 0.95 1.081 .093 .148 .107
2020 1.42 1.11 1.55 -.005 0.92 1.114 .093 .191 .121
2030 1.65 1.19 1.85 -.003 0.90 1.086 .100 .231 .138
2050 2.18 1.33 2.58 .024 0.85 1.082 .122 .238 .156
2075 3.00 1.60 3.72 .020 0.81 1.131 .136 .255 .146
2100 4.06 2.14 5.06 .015 0.81 1.150 .134 .274 .133
Doubling 2000 1.01 1.00 1.00 .002 1.00 1.012 .090 .136 .098
immigration 2005 1.13 1.01 1.16 .001 0.97 1.063 .093 .136 .102
2010 1.25 1.04 1.32 .002 0.94 1.102 .094 .144 .106
2020 1.53 1.15 1.68 -.005 0.91 1.142 .094 .182 .122
2030 1.86 1.28 2.09 -.001 0.88 1.118 .103 .215 .138
2050 2.61 1.54 3.11 .021 0.84 1.124 .121 .224 .154
2075 3.83 2.01 4.75 .019 0.81 1.160 .135 .244 .143
2100 5.35 2.85 6.62 .014 0.81 1.168 .130 .267 .128
Privatizing 2000 1.01 1.00 1.01 -.016 1.00 1.077 .090 .047 .093
pensions 2005 1.12 1.04 1.14 -.018 0.98 1.132 .085 .047 .097
2010 1.23 1.11 1.28 -.019 0.97 1.172 .083 .048 .099
2020 1.48 1.32 1.56 -.031 0.96 1.213 .077 .056 .109
2030 1.77 1.57 1.86 -.033 0.96 1.200 .076 .065 .119
2050 2.46 2.19 2.60 -.008 0.96 1.187 .076 .064 .126
2075 3.58 3.18 3.76 -.002 0.96 1.179 .078 .066 .118
2100 4.93 4.56 5.11 .002 0.97 1.167 .075 .070 .108
3
7Table 10: Simulation results for the EU (open economy)
Eﬀective Before- Social Average
National Capital Labor Current Tax Capital Interest Security Wage
Year Income Stock Supply Account Wage Price Rate Cost Rate Tax
Base Case 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 -.012 1.00 1.000 .090 .265 .142
2005 1.07 0.98 1.10 -.011 0.97 1.038 .093 .274 .145
2010 1.13 0.98 1.19 -.006 0.95 1.063 .093 .288 .150
2020 1.24 0.99 1.33 .006 0.93 1.074 .093 .332 .165
2030 1.28 0.98 1.40 -.001 0.92 1.028 .100 .410 .194
2050 1.41 0.92 1.63 -.022 0.87 1.039 .122 .451 .241
2075 1.72 0.95 2.10 -.024 0.82 1.119 .136 .412 .279
2100 2.23 1.18 2.76 -.019 0.81 1.172 .134 .387 .290
Doubling 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 -.012 1.00 1.003 .090 .266 .140
immigration 2005 1.07 0.98 1.11 -.011 0.97 1.041 .093 .273 .144
2010 1.15 0.98 1.21 -.006 0.95 1.069 .094 .285 .149
2020 1.28 1.00 1.39 .005 0.92 1.085 .094 .325 .164
2030 1.35 1.01 1.49 -.003 0.91 1.047 .103 .395 .193
2050 1.57 1.00 1.83 -.020 0.86 1.073 .121 .428 .236
2075 2.02 1.10 2.48 -.024 0.82 1.146 .135 .394 .269
2100 2.70 1.45 3.33 -.019 0.81 1.192 .130 .378 .274
Privatizing 2000 1.02 1.00 1.02 -.003 0.99 1.075 .090 .093 .138
pensions 2005 1.09 1.02 1.12 .000 0.97 1.118 .085 .094 .138
2010 1.16 1.06 1.20 .007 0.97 1.146 .083 .095 .137
2020 1.28 1.16 1.33 .021 0.96 1.165 .077 .100 .138
2030 1.35 1.26 1.39 .020 0.97 1.134 .076 .110 .148
2050 1.52 1.43 1.55 .009 0.98 1.126 .076 .119 .154
2075 1.81 1.70 1.86 .003 0.97 1.152 .078 .115 .152
2100 2.33 2.19 2.40 -.002 0.97 1.183 .075 .111 .148
3
8Table 11: Simulation results for Japan (open economy)
Eﬀective Before- Social Average
National Capital Labor Current Tax Capital Interest Security Wage
Year Income Stock Supply Account Wage Price Rate Cost Rate Tax
Base Case 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 .031 1.00 1.000 .090 .245 .141
2005 1.03 0.96 1.05 .029 0.98 1.028 .093 .274 .142
2010 1.05 0.94 1.08 .011 0.97 1.047 .093 .318 .147
2020 1.09 0.91 1.15 -.004 0.94 1.064 .093 .369 .160
2030 1.09 0.86 1.18 .015 0.92 1.017 .100 .412 .177
2050 1.05 0.73 1.19 -.019 0.88 1.016 .122 .504 .202
2075 1.19 0.67 1.43 -.008 0.83 1.116 .136 .430 .226
2100 1.43 0.77 1.76 -.006 0.81 1.186 .134 .398 .235
Doubling 2000 1.00 1.00 1.00 .031 1.00 0.999 .090 .245 .141
immigration 2005 1.03 0.96 1.06 .031 0.98 1.025 .093 .274 .141
2010 1.05 0.94 1.09 .013 0.96 1.045 .094 .318 .146
2020 1.10 0.90 1.17 -.002 0.94 1.064 .094 .365 .159
2030 1.11 0.86 1.21 .014 0.92 1.023 .103 .406 .176
2050 1.11 0.75 1.26 -.021 0.88 1.041 .121 .488 .200
2075 1.29 0.73 1.56 -.010 0.83 1.135 .135 .418 .223
2100 1.60 0.87 1.96 -.008 0.82 1.204 .130 .388 .229
Privatizing 2000 1.01 1.00 1.02 .042 1.00 1.071 .090 .079 .135
pensions 2005 1.04 1.00 1.07 .040 0.99 1.106 .085 .084 .134
2010 1.07 1.01 1.09 .027 0.99 1.130 .083 .090 .135
2020 1.13 1.06 1.15 .019 0.98 1.156 .077 .103 .138
2030 1.16 1.10 1.18 .038 0.99 1.126 .076 .110 .141
2050 1.16 1.13 1.16 .001 1.00 1.117 .076 .127 .144
2075 1.28 1.22 1.29 .000 0.99 1.156 .078 .116 .145
2100 1.57 1.48 1.60 -.005 0.99 1.206 .075 .106 .148
3
9Table 12: Welfare eﬀects of doubling immigration
(open economy case)
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 12 3 123123
1910 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.22 0.09 0.02
1920 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.11 0.09
1930 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.24 0.17 0.10
1940 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.13 0.27 0.22 0.17
1950 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.19
1960 -0.21 -0.02 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.17
1970 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.15
1980 0.38 0.31 0.13 0.54 0.45 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.11
1990 0.53 0.43 0.10 1.30 1.04 0.20 0.52 0.45 0.12
2000 0.97 0.78 0.22 2.64 2.17 0.35 1.08 0.89 0.13
2010 1.18 0.93 0.27 4.44 3.83 0.63 1.93 1.64 0.16
2020 1.17 0.90 0.22 5.42 4.74 0.86 2.94 2.57 0.21
2030 1.58 1.16 0.34 5.85 5.06 1.10 3.40 2.95 0.30
Table 13: Welfare eﬀects of privatizing pensions
(open economy case)
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 123 123 123
1910 -3.36 -1.65 -0.20 -7.58 -3.22 -0.69 -6.12 -2.08 -0.32
1920 -3.75 -1.95 -0.45 -9.72 -5.76 -2.46 -9.37 -5.18 -1.66
1930 -4.57 -2.69 -0.85 -10.32 -6.42 -3.05 -10.35 -5.72 -1.80
1940 -6.71 -4.11 -1.53 -10.91 -6.76 -2.93 -11.39 -7.18 -3.07
1950 -6.60 -4.15 -1.97 -8.50 -5.99 -3.30 -8.24 -5.54 -2.97
1960 -3.38 -2.39 -2.05 -2.40 -2.02 -3.10 -0.74 -0.57 -2.76
1970 1.08 0.70 -1.41 4.19 2.92 -2.19 5.82 4.30 -2.07
1980 4.52 3.16 -0.47 11.89 9.02 -0.12 12.96 9.79 -0.58
1990 10.36 7.07 0.67 23.87 17.63 2.14 25.18 18.74 1.18
2000 17.56 11.95 2.29 42.93 31.52 5.47 40.65 29.61 3.24
2010 23.88 16.07 3.78 65.26 48.07 9.42 60.00 43.65 5.71
2020 28.96 19.32 4.96 81.46 59.69 12.84 77.22 56.39 8.12
2030 32.95 21.87 5.86 90.44 65.78 15.39 83.51 60.58 9.73
40